THEORIES OF INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS.
(Literature review).

José Luis Velázquez.

The aim of this Literature review is to present an overview of the main theories that try to explain the Role of Interest Groups in American Politics.

Along the work, I shall examine the theories in the following order:
I. The Traditional Theory of Groups.
II. The Orthodox Theories of Groups.
III. Olson's By-product Theory of Groups.
IV. Salisbury's Exchange Theory of Groups.
V. Moe's Organizational Formation and Maintenance, and Internal
Politics Theory of Groups.
VI. Sabatier's Commitment Theory of Groups.
VII. Cumulative Knowledge, Controversies, and Remaining Gaps in the Research Area.

_________________________________


I. The Traditional Theory of Groups.
According to Olson the Traditional Theory of Groups present two basic variant: the Causal Variant and the Formal Variant.

a. The Causal Variant assumes that privates organizations and groups are "ubiquitous", and that ubiquity is due to a fundamental human propensity to forma and joint associations.

In this way, Aristotle argue that "Men journey together with a view to particular advantage, and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the pourpous of life, and similarly the political association seem to have come together originally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the general advantages it brings."[1]

Aristotle based in an alleged human propensity to form associations (a gregarius faculty) said, as well that "man was by nature a political animal"[2].

Among the exponents of this Causal Variant, Olson includes: Gaetano Mosca[3], Georg Simmel[4] and Artur Bentley[5].

b. The Formal Variant (Olson argues) also emphasizes the universality of groups, but does not begin with any "instinct" or "tendency" to joint groups. Instead it attempts to explain the association and groups affiliations of the present day as an aspect of modern industrial societies out of "primitive" societies that preceded them. It begins with the fact that "primary " groups like family and kindship groups are predominant in primitive societies. But, as society develops, there is structural differentiation: new associations emerge to take on some of the functions that the family had previusly undertaken.


Talcott Parson [6] ,Charles H. Cooley[7], George C. Homans[8] and R.M. MacIver[9] are among the exponent of this version.

Olson sustain that both variant of the Traditional theory of Goups, have left implicit and unclear the following question: Wath is the fundamental source which accounts alike for the small primary group in primitive societies and the large voluntary associations of modern times? Is it "instinct" ,"tendency" or the performance of certain functions?

For Olson,it is characterictic of the Traditional Theory in all its forms that it assumes that participation in voluntary associations is virtually universal, and that small groups and large organizations tend to attract menbers for the same reason. The causal variant of the theory assumes a propensity to belong to groups without drawing any distinction between groups of diferent sizes. Though the more sophisticated variant may be credited with drawing a distingtion between those function that can best be served by small groups and those that can be served by large associations.

II. The Orthodox Theories of Groups.
a. The Pluralist Tradition.
According to Olson, moderns theories of groups derives from the "Pluralist Tradition"."It is the plitical philosophy wich argues that privates associations of all kinds, and specially labor unions, churches, and cooperatives, should have a larger constitutional role in society, and that the state should not have an unlimited control over the plurality of those private association. It opposes the Hegelian veneration of the state, on the one hand, but fears the anarchistic and laissez-faire individualistic extremes, on the other, and ends up seeking safety in a society in wich a number of important private associations provide a cushion between the individual and the state."[10]

The "pluralist" theorist are: A.D. Lindsay, Otto von Gierke, F. W. Maitland, John Dewey, Joseph Paul-Boncour and Emile Durkheim.[11]

John R. Commons: The peassure group as a social mechanism of economic redistribution to compesate for market failure.
The first advocate and precursor of pluralism in the United States was the institutional economist John R. Commons[12]. The basis for Commons' thinking was the view that the market mechanisms did not of themselves bring about fair results to the different groups in the economy, and the conviction that this unfairness was due to disparities in the bargaining power of those diferent groups. Those disparities would not be remuved by collective action promoted by the goverment unless pressure grups forced through the necessary reforms, since machine politicians and men of wealth controlled the legislatures. Thus pressure grups were to Commons virtually an indispensable means for the achievement of a just and rational economic order. The conflict among different interest groups were the vehicles of reform and progress.

"But the most important of Commons' thought for the present purpose was his belief that economic pressure groups were more representative of the people than the legislatures based on territorial representation".

The belief that group interest and group behavior are the primary forces in economic as well as in political behavior, has been considered the main finding of the original pluralist thinkers, like Commons. But, Olson argues that "While [they] are praiced for seeing the fundamental an inevitable character of economic and political action on behalf of group interests, they are chiled for failing to examine the group's "forms, mutations, and permutations in a scientific spirit".

Then, in order to fill this gap of analysis in the original pluralist thought, a group of theorists emerged that called themselves "Analytical Pluralist".

b. The Analytical Pluralists.
Earl Latham: The group as the basic political unit.
Earl Latham[13] is considered the first analytical pluralist. In his book "The Group Basis of Politics" Latham brings to the realm of politics Commons' economic findings. Latham argues that the structure of society is associational. Groups are its basic unit. And what is true of society is true of the economic comunity.

Arthur F. Bentley: Public policy as the resultant of groups pressures.
Latham's argument was, after, fully developed in the political field by Arthur F Bentley, considers by Olson "The most important of the 'modern' or analytical' pluralist. In his book "The Proces of Government"[14] Bentley sustains that there are no effective individual interest, that every group has its interests, that these insterest always result in group action, and that there is no one group interest that includes every one in society.

Based in these assuptions, Bentley was able to claim that all things involving government, all things great and small, are determined by the conflicting groups pressures. Thus, the resultant of the groups pressures was the one and only determinant of the course of government policy. This was the key to understanding government in general and economic policy in particular.

Bentley argues that "Groups had a degree of power or pressure more or less in proportion to their numbers. The larger, more nearly general, interest would usully tend to defeat the smaller, narrower, special interest.

Finally, Bentley sustains that "The logrolling of special interests was not to be feared: it was an excellent, efficient device for adjusting group interest.

Olson criticized Bentley theory for not to explain, why the needs of the different groups in society would tend to be reflected in politically or economically effective pressure. And not to consider carefully what it is that causes groups to organize and act effectivelly. Or why some groups are more important in some societies and other groups important in other societies and periods.

David Truman: Social Order and Disturbance.
Truman[15] Social Order and Disturbance Theory is based in the following assumptions: Simple societies have no associations (in the thecnical sense of the term); as they more complex, i.e., as highly differentiated institutionalized groups increase in numbers, societies evolve greater numbers of associations. This increse in the number of associations will inevitably have its impact on government. The associations will acquire connections with the institutions of government whenever government is important to the groups in question. This tendency for associations to arise to fill the needs of the groups in society is specially evident in the economic sphere.

But, the core of Truman Theory is quite similar to Commons's view.
Truman considers that markets failures to allocate resources in society, produce "disturbances and dislocations"." These disturbances and dislocations inevitably produced associations -of owners, of workers, of farmers- operating upon government to mitigate and control the revanges of the system through tariffs, subsidies, wages guarantees, social insurance and the like."

Truman argues that individuals joint groups bacause this activity is a natural interaction of people with similar belief and interest.

Olson considers that "Truman appear to contend that 'suffering,' 'dislocation,' and 'disturbances' will almost inevitably result in organized political pressure. Those disadvantaged groups that need an organization will in fact come to have an organization. But the facts of recent political life do not necesarilly substantiate this view."

Olson concluded that "Truman like Bentley, neglected individual interest; group interest, group attitudes, and group pressures were the only thing that mattered." Thus, there was a missing link in the "analytical pluralist theory" between individual and group.

III. Olson's By-product Theory of Groups.
The Analytical Pluralist Theory (APT) assumed that man is a social animal drawn to interact with people of similar views, whereas Olson began with the premise that individuals are autonomous and seek to maximize their own material wellbeing.

The APT second assuption is that there is an identity between individual interest and the interest of the group. In this sense, Olson argue that "The view that groups act to serve their interests presumably is based upon the assumption that the individuals in groups act aut of self-interest." Thus, EPT regard group interest as the agregation of its individual members self-interest.

At variance, Olson assumes that there is a difference between individual interest and group interest. Wile individual interest seeks "private good," group interest seeks "collective good".

For Olson,"private good" is the achievement of an individual goal or the satisfaction of an individual need. It can be a meterial reward, social status or social acceptance. On the other hand, "collective good" is "The achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest." The crucial difference between both is that wile private goods are exclusively for an individual, collective goods "must be available to everyone if they are available to anyone." And "The achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group."

Then, Olson argues that "Purely personal or individual interest can be advanced, and usually advanced most efficiently, by individual, unorganized action." Thus,"rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest." Furthermore, Olson concludes that considering the universal nature of collective good "Though all of the members of the group have a common interest in obtaining this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or not."

For Olson the problem of collective action is that rational self-interst individual do not have incentives to joint groups in order to obtain a collective good. They rather prefer to be "Free Riders."

In order to solve this anomaly, Olson introduce the notion that "Selective Incentives" have to be offered to individuals to make them act in their common interest. At this point Olson differentiate between small and large groups according to the selective incentive they introduce to achieve the collective action.

Olson claim that "In Small groups there may very well be some voluntary action in support of the common purposes of the individuals in the group, but in most cases this action will cease before it reaches the optimal level for the member of the group as a whole. In the sharing of the cost of efforts to achieve a common goal in small groups, there is however a surprising tendency for the exploitation of the great by the small. In other words, an individual's - or a small subset of individuals'- contribution is sufficiently large to be noticeable to other members. Members in small groups, also, have some means of monitoring tendencies toward free-riding and convincing free-riders to share the burden of providing the collective good and organization cost. " But in order to keep the voluntary action at its optimal level small group have to provide their member with social incentives and social pessures, which are non-collective goods. The first are increases in social status, social acceptance, prestige, respect, frienship etc. And the second are social exclusion, induction of sense of guilt, destruction of self esteem, etc.(See Annex I)

For Olson the most problematic is the logic of collective action in the large groups, due to the lack of incentives for the self-interest individual and its propensity to become a free rider. Olson solve this problem of participation in collective action claiming that in order to bring free riders in, and voluntary action at its optimal level, large groups have to introduce a second set of "selective incentives" which are: economic incentives and coercion.(See Annex I).

Olson argues that "The lobbies of large economic groups are the by-pruducts of organizations that have the capacity to 'mobilize' a latent grou with 'sective incentives.' The only organizations that have the 'selective incentives' available are those that (1) have the authority and capacity to be coercive, or 92) have a source of positive inducements that they can offer the individuals in a latent group."

According to this view, collective action i.e. lobbying and political activities of an interest group, is a by product
of the provision for selective incentives which are a mixture of coercion, legal, financial,an economic benefits, available the group membership.

Olson explain the formation and function of american trade unions according to the large group model, in which small trade unions, in the 1930's introduced coercion, representation and collective barganning as selective incentives to become large trade unions with political power and strong lobbying activities. On the other hand, the activities of "the american trade, business, and commercial organizations" fit the Small Group model or "the Special Interest Theory".According to Olson, as small groups they have large per share beneits and can easily monitor free-riding . Olson concludes that: "Whereas almost every occupationational group involves thousand of workers, and whereas almost any subdivision of agriculture also involves thousands of people, the business interest of the country normally are congregated in oligopoly-size groups or industries."

Olson's theory have sparked several criticism from which several extensions of the "rational man model" and a coherent body of "incentive theories now exist.

At the center of the controversy, is Olson assumption that "individuals operate with perfect information to maximize their self-interest. Sabatier[16] considers that "His view of the individual as exceedingly egoistic and materialistic has great difficulty accounting for the presence of houndreds of viable consumer, environmental, civil right, and other groups. In fact, there is increasing evidence that many citizens are willing to bear what they peceive to be their 'fair share' of providing collective goods, rather than simply maximizing their own material well-being (Sears et al. 1980; Marwell and Ames 1981; Margolis 1982; Tyler 1990)."

Olson's notion of "selective incentives" to joint a group has been, also criticized of being narrow and exclusively materialistic. Peter B Clark and James Q. Wilson distinguish tree types of benefits that can accrue to an individual by belonging to an interest group:
Material: tangible rewards that can usually be tranlated into monetary terms.
Solidary: social rewards that derive from associating in group activities.
Purposive: rewards associated with ideological or issue- oriented goals that offer no significant tangible benefits to members.[17]

According to other scholars, Olson's economic approach to interest group do not account for the role played by socio-phsichological variables like: lidership, and organization in the logic of collective action. This lead Salisbury to develop an early version of a new theory called "The Exchange Theory".


IV. Salisbury's exchange Theory of Groups.
For Salisbury the formation of an interest group is exceedingly problematic: "It requires somebody to emerge who is willing to bear the substantial cost of organizing a group by locating potential members, organizing meetings, and convincing them to contribute time and money to the new group"

Salisbury, as Olson, began with the premise that most individuals are preoccupied with their material self-interest and thus would be unwilling to contribute much to the provision of a collective good.
According to Sabatier[18],"Salisbury's solution to group formation was to focus on individual enterpreneurs willing to bear the initial organization costs in return not for a share of the collective benefits but instead for a staff job with the new organization. This enabled him to account for the formation of a variety of consumer, farm, labor and environmental groups with which Olson had difficulty.

Acknowledging that the organizers of some purposive groups might be skilled at articulating a common group interest, Salisbury nevertheless argued that:
1. Group organizers were essentially small-business people offering benefits for the price of memebership in order to finance their jobs."

2. Most group activity has little to do with efforts to affect public policy decisions but is concerned rather with the internal exchange of benefits by which the group is organized and sustained" (Salisbury 1969:20). These benefits can be selective material, solidary or expressive, with the first predominating in most viable organizations. For Salisbury, as for James Q. Wilson (1973), group leaders were preoccupied with organizational maintenance -with providing whatever was necessary to keep the dues coming.

3. Leader-member belief congruence was irrelevant, as long as the benefits offered were sufficient to maintain membership. He did suggest, however, that congruence would probably be high in organizations where collective policy benefits provided important inducements to membership[19].

Sabatier argues that, "Salisbury's emphasis on the importance of interest group entrepreneurs is a major contribution to the field. In a study of the origins of eighty-three national public interest groups, for example, Jeffrey Berry (1977:24; 1978) found that only twenty-four could be explained by Truman's disturbance theory whereas fifty-five could be traced to the efforts of a specific 'entrepreneur'."[20]

Sabatier considers that "Salisbury's entrepreneur may, however, be more important in organizing economic interest groups. But like Olson's, his view of individuals as exceedingly self-interested -and of group leaders as preoccupied with keeping their business operating- seemed to miss something critical in a wide variety of consumer, environmental, civil rights, and other groups."[21]

Garson[22] claims that "The exchange theory of groups portrayed group leaders as entrepreneurs selling the benefits of group affiliation for a price. Political organization were quasi-firms, producing and exchanging legitimacy (a quasi-good in a abroader political exchange environment. The clear normative implication of this perspective supported more government reliance on the economic marketplace and other more esoteric mechanisms whereby individual choice could be the basis of aggregate decision."

V. Moe's Organizational Formation and Maintenance, and Internal Politics Theory of Groups.[23]

Moe's theory has been considered an expanded version of the Exchange Theory, but less parsimonious.
Moe argues that the emergence and functioning of interest groups "only can be understood by taking into account the close interconnection of internal politics and the structural determinant of formation and maintenance. Mechanisms of comunications, the administration of membership benefits, the ecology of member sugroups, and the patterns of relation with outsiders".

Accordingly, his analysis is broken down into three areas of theoretical interest:
a. The individual decision to join.
Moe's decision to join is initially approached by setting aut Olson's original model and showing how its dramatic conclusions about group membership are derived. By droping the assuption of perfect information and allowing individuals to base decisions on their (imperfect) perceptions of the objective situation, Moe arrive at a more general model from which Olson's "nonpolitical" perspective no longer follows. It is replaced by a broader perspective that links the decision to join with varying individual perceptions and indicates that members may join for political reasons if they think their contributions "make a difference" in providing some of the collective goods. While the collective good-selective incentive distinction remains a crucial one, both nonpolitical and political inducements now have a central logical roles to play in explaining group membership[24].


b.organization formation and maintenance.
Moe's revised model of the membership decision is incorporated into a larger organizational framework by introducing a leadership component "The Political Entrepreneur," allowing for basic types of participants ( for example, staff personnel, outsiders), and imposing certain simplifications on the organization and its environment. Organizational formation and maintenance are then approached by singling out the strategic options available to the political entrepreneur with respect to basic organizational dimensions -communications, the administration of selective incentives, the administration of collective goods, members barganing, and environmental relationship - and by recognizing the cost and benefits associated with his various options. Moe argues that this strategic and organizational options available to the political entrepreneur represent distinctive kinds of advantages and disadvantages, and that the entrepreneur approach in building and maintaining the organization will be shaped accordingly.

c) internal politics.
Moe's analysis of the group internal politics assumes that the entrepreneur make all policy decisions for the group. The central question becomes How is influence over his decision distributed among individuals? According to Moe, some members count much more than others in internal politics and that many members, particularly those who join purely for nonpolitical reasons, may have no basis at all for having an impact. Influence, moreover, is not restricted to elements within the membership; it is also available to staff members and outsiders, and these participant may play crucial roles in the determination of group policy.

Moe argues that decision to join, organizational formation and maintenance, and internal politics constitutes his analysis of "material association," in other words groups based on the assumption that individuals are self-interested. In his analysis Moe attempt to relax "this simplifying assuption," allowing for additional types of individual values, in order to pursue a more complete analysis, which in taking maximum advantage of the assumption of economic self-interest, is not in the end entirely constrained by it. Moe claims that the introduction of these supplementary values have far-reaching consequences for all the basic organizational dimensions." Above all, they have the potential for enhancing group representativeness, threatening organizational stability, and producing a more dynamic organizational context in which groups goals and individual political preferences are more centrally determining factors than in material associations."[25]

Finally, Moe argues that his approach differs from Olson's analysis ina fundamental sense "in relaxing his original assuptions we are led to a perspective on group membership that has ample room in it for politically based membership. Because of the logical roles of imperfect information and values other that economic self-interest, rational behavior is not inconsistent with the persuit of common interest"[26].

Sabtier[27] summing up Moe's argument consideres that "In analyzing congruence between leaders and members of interest groups, Terry Moe distinguishes between organizations in which selective material incentives are important inducements to membership versus groups in which purposive or collective policy benefits predominate. In the former, there is no reason to expect leader-member policy congruence, as the organization's policy positions are irrelevant to group maintenance. In the latter -comprising most business and farm organizations, as well as virtually all noneconomic groups -congruence should be substantial as leaders will be solicitous of members' views and will go to considerable lengths to influence them. He also notes, however, that information costs probably preclude most members from having accurate perceptions of their leader's beliefs and actions.


VI. Sabatier's Commitment Theory of Groups.
Sabatier[28] begins his argument saying that "Whereas Olson and, to a lesser extent, Salisbury started from the assumption that most people are egoistic materials, commitment theory received its initial impetus from empirical research demonstrating that political party activists are more ideologically extreme than ordinary party members (Mc Closkey et al. 1960; Miller and Jennings 1987). From this came its basic premise: The high degree of time, energy, and resources needed to be involved in group activities stems from "beliefs about good policy" (Sabatier and McLaughlin 1990). Expected collective benefits arising from a group's political activities thus are critical to political participation".

Sabatier continues arguing that "These benefits may be material -for example, financial benefits arising from changes in law- or they may be more ideological/purposive. In many cases, they will be a mixture of the two. Self-interested behavior typically becomes intertwined with congruent conceptions of improving social welfare, either out of self respect or concerns of political efficacy (Tesser 1978; Margolis 1982:100). Although material self-interest may create an incentive to join an interest group, typically only those individuals for whom the perceived benefits are quite large or who have buttressed self-interest with ideological incentives will be sufficiently committed to join and, then, to become leaders. Thus commitment theory expects to find increasing degrees of commitment to collective benefits as one moves from the potential members of a group to its members and then to its leaders (Sabatier and Mc Cubbin 1990)[29]".

Commitment theory would expect a group to be organized by potential members or by entrepreneurs strongly commmitted to its collective political goals. Their motivation could be significant material self-interest (e.g., adjacent landowners organizing a group to save a scenic area) or it could be ideological (e.g., Ralph Nader) (McCarry 1972).

Members would come from the subset of particularly committed people within its "potential" group (i.e., people who professed allegiance to the interest group's purposes or who should share in its collective benefits). These committed people, however, make up only a small percentage of potential beneficiaries. Commitment theory, then, agrees with by-product theory in hypothesizing that only a small percentage of the beneficiaries of a group's political activities will be members, but it does so for radically different reasons. Olson argued that rational individuals will free-ride unless the group offers selective incentives greater than the cost of membership. Sabatier contends that "instead most potential members will lack the material or ideological commitment to take the time and expense to join; most people are simply not very interested in, or informed about, policy issues (Verba and Nie 1972; Lau and Sears 1986)".

As for belief congruence between members and leaders, Sabatier's Commitment theory clearly predicts that "leaders will be more committed to the group's collective purposes -more ideologically extreme- than its members because it is that commitment that makes them willing to bear the cost of going to meetings, writing letters, and all of the other mundane tasks necessary to keep the group going (Sabatier and McLaughlin 1990)."[30]

Finally, Commitment theory might seem to apply better to purposive groups than to traditional economic interest groups.




VII. Cumulative Knowledge, Controversies, and Remaining Gaps in the Research Area.
In the more than twenty years since the publication of Olson and Salisbury's essays, rational accion and exchange theory have become the dominant paradigms among students of interest group organization. Most of the major texts give a prominent role to self-interest individuals and exchange relationships between leaders and members, to the importance of various incentives, and to problems of organizing and maintaining such groups. But the modern versions has expanded and modified Olson and Salisbury's original proposal in several important respects.

First, and perhaps most importantly, several studies have shown that members of most groups -economic as well as purposive- view contributing to collective political benefits as a more important inducement to membership that the sort of selective material and solidary benefits Salisbury and Olson emphasized. As Sabatier has pointed out, however " these results from member surveys should be taken with a grain of salt pending evidence that members are, in fact, more committed to the organization's policy goals than are nonmembers."[31]
Second, Salisbury's notion of the entrepreneur has been expanded considerably. Rather than being viewed primarily as small-business people trying to make a living selling memberships, the organizers of many groups are perceived as being genuinely motivated by policy goals. In addition, the critical role of government agencies and foundations in organizing and funding many groups has been repeatedly documented.[32]
Third, leader-member exchange relationships in many groups are not as critical as Salisbury envisaged. For example, Berry[33] found that 30% of national public interest organizations in the early 1970's had no members; they were supported almost entirely by foundation and government grants. Jack Walker's (1983) survey of national interest groups found that citizen and nonprofit organizations received an average of 43 percent and 24% of their revenues, respectively, from nonmember sources, primarily government, foundations, and individual gifts. Organizational maintenance is still critical, but many groups are less dependent upon member dues than was once thought.[34]
Finally, with respect to leader-member belief congruence, scholars working within the exchange tradition have conflicting views. Some contend that interest group staff are preoccupied with maintenance needs and thus very solicitous of members' policy preferences, whereas others argue that they are often given considerable freedom to pursue their own policy agendas as compensation for substandard salaries.[35]

There is a growing consensus in the Political Science community that The expanded version of exchange theory can clearly account for a higher percentage of the organizational features of interest groups than the theories previously proposed by Truman, Olson, and Salisbury. Truman completely missed the importance of selective incentives and the problems of turning potential groups into viable organizations. Olson and Salisbury offered clear and parsimonious explanations of those phenomena, but the view of the individual as exceedingly egoistic and materialistic has great difficulty accounting for the presence of hundred of viable, active and expanding groups in American politics.

But, as Sabatier strongly argues "The broader version of exchange theory is becoming so inclusive, however, that it risks losing its coherence and parsimony. Stating the first principles" of the expanded version is becoming more difficult. A theory that appears to account for everything -after the fact- may be incapable of predicting anything. The proponents of this view might consider concentrating their efforts on developing a clearer set of theoretical premises and falsifiable hypotheses."[36]

In brief, during the last 25 years the Theories of group has tended to move from explanation sucesively based on "Instinct", "Functions," "Rational self-interested accion," "Exchange" and "Organizational," to explanation based on non-material incentives.
This trend shows, as well, a change in the assumtion of model of man, from an exceedingly sel-interested, perfect informed being, to a commited with collective good and imperfect imformed one.


[1] Aristotle. Ethics viii.91160a.
[2] Aristotle. Politics i2.9.1253a.
[3] The Rulin Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993),p.163.
[4] Simmel Georg. Conflict and the Web of Groups Affiliations, trans, Kurt Wolff and Reinhard Bendix (Glencoe,III.:Freee Press,1950.
[5] Bentley Arthur.The Process of Government. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
[6] Talcott Parson and Robert F. Bales. Family (Glecone, ILL.: Free Press 1955).See also Working Papers in the Theory of Action.
[7] Charle H. Cooley, Social Organization (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), p 23.
[8] George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p.1;

[9] MacIver in Enciclopaedia of Social Science. VII, 144-148.


[10] Olson. M: The logic of Collective Action.Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965 pp. 111-112.
[11] A. D. Lindsay,The Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943); Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, translated with an introduction by F. W. Maitland (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1900), and Natural law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800, translated with an introduction by Ernest Barker (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1950); F. W. Maitland, "Moral Personality and Legal Personality," in Maitland -Selected Essays, ed. H.D. Hazeltine, G. Lapsey, and P. H. Winfield (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1936), pp. 223-239; John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, 3rd ed. (Denver: Allan Swallow, 1954), pp. 22-23, 26-27, 28-33, 72-73, and 188; Joseph Paul-Boncour, Le Fédéralisme économique; étude sur les rapports de l'individu et des groupements professionnels (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1900), and Reflections of the French Republic, trans. George Marion, Jr. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), I, 40 and 138-147; Emile Durkheim, Le Suicide (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1897), and the Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (Glencoe, III: Free Press, 1947), esp. pp. 1-31.
[12] John R. Commons, Representative Democracy (New York: Bureau of Economic Research, n.d.); Institutional Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), II, 877-903; The Economics of Collective Action (New York: Macmillan, 1950).
[13] Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 10; see also David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 46-47.
[14] Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Evanston, III: Principia Press, 1949). Although this book was first published in 1908, and thus is contemporaneous with many of the original or philosophical pluralist writings, its approach is completely in harmony with modern political science.
[15] David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred Al Knopf, 1958).
[16] Sabatier Paul: Interest Group Membership and Organization: Multiple Theory. In Mark P. Petracca: The Politics of Interest. Westview Press.1992.pp.99-129.
[17] Sabatier. P. Op.cit. p.102.
[18] Sabatier P. Op. Cit. p 106.

[19] Salisbury R. Op. Cit Pp:11-3, 17-18, 25-27.
[20] Sabatier P. Op. Cit. Pp: 107.
[21] Sabatier P. Op. Cit. P:106.
[22] Garson David G. "Group Theories of Politics".Sage Publications.London. 1978. p:141.
[23] Moe Terry M. "The Organization of Interest". The University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1980.
[24] Moe T. Op. cit. P.6.
[25] Moe T. Op.cit. p 7.
[26] Moe T. Op.cit. P .9.

[27] Sabatier P. Op. cit. P. 108.
[28] Sabatier paul. Op cit. P. 109.
[29] Ibid., p. 109.
[30] Ibid,.p 110.
[31] Ibid,. p.110.
[32] See Sabatier P. 1975. social Movements and Regulatory Agencies" 6 Policy Science. 301-342. Wlker Jack. 1983 "The Origens and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America." 77 American Political Science Review 390-406.
[33] See Berry Jeffrey. 1977. Lobbying for the People. Princeton University Press.
[34] Sabatier P. Op.cit. p 108.
[35] See: Wilson James 1973. Political Organizations. New York: Basic Books; and Hayes Michael. 1986. The New Group Universe. In Allan J. Cigler and Burdett Loomis, ed, Interst Groups Politics. Wasington D.C. Congressional Quartely Press.
[36] Ibid.,p. 109.